the Moroccan berm: also omitted from McDonald's Morocco W. Sahara friendly world maps
This recent story in Maghrebia about a gaffe by McDonald’s which included a world map with Western Sahara on it in Happymeals to unsuspecting Moroccan youths got me meditating on what the future for some kind of settlement is on the region. Both the Moor Next Door and Western Sahara Info have interesting posts on the recent call by Morocco to open the border which touch peripherally on the issue but I would like to delve a little deeper into what the implications are for the various scenarios from the Moroccan standpoint because Morocco seems to me to be enjoying a period of relative strength and we may soon see a day where McDonald’s will include a map of Morocco without any dividing line across the middle in Happymeals all over the globe.
The Case for the Status Quo: As in all questions of international politics it seems relatively safe to assume that one possibility is that nothing really significant will happen in the short term. Alle correctly points out this means that Morocco is still going to be spending a high percentage of GNP on maintaining its forces in the Western Sahara but I think that history shows this is a price that Morocco is willing to pay. Presumably paying will be made easier considering that Morocco appears to enjoy a considerable strategic advantage in the region and that time allows them to continue to stack the region with migrants and hold their military gains. It would take a really significant downturn in the Moroccan economy before the basic military calculus on troop levels is going to change. Furthermore there seems to be a number of additional factors that make either a status quo or settlement in Morocco’s favor likely.
International Politricks: One significant factor in Morocco’s favor is that the major players in the UN all appear to be on their side. France and the US have both been pretty unambiguous about their willingness to accept a resolution favorable to Morocco and I don’t know any other member of the security council that cares enough about the conflict to expend significant energy on behalf of the POLISARIO (Maybe Russia because of their strong ties to Algeria?). Time also is significant in this equation. As long as Morocco keeps their security forces in check and doesn’t allow them to get out of control and cause a huge uproar in the region their case gets stronger and stronger. The International Community (especially propelled by France & the US) is unlikely to want to change the situation significantly and the stronger Morocco’s hold gets demographically the harder it is for me to see any real change occurring– unless there is some military or police action which is so egregious that it embarrasses the US and France and undermines their ability to support Morocco. But even so Morocco’s hand internationally is very strong.
Economic$: I haven’t checked prices on phosphates recently but my guess is that they are probably still holding relatively high and with concerns about food prices/shortages everywhere there is probably not too much of a chance that they will go down anytime soon. While this is in itself is not so significant I think that governments are going to view a deal that accommodates Morocco as the least destabilizing (especially if Morocco is smart about how they pitch the final deal). Morocco is a darling of organizations like the IMF, World Bank, and USAID who want to see it succeed and I think these organizations will caution against any plan that turns those resources over to POLISARIO because they are going to be viewed as less trustworthy than the Moroccans who already have the infrastructure in place and are doing a pretty decent job of exploiting and selling phosphates as fast as they can.
Military Power: Will delve into this a bit more below but it seems to me like Morocco has the will power to stick this one out. While I am certain that there are planners in the Ministry of Defense that would love to drop troop levels in the region so they could get some money towards important projects like a much needed upgrade to the air force, Morocco has been working around the Sahara problem for a number of years now and the Moroccan’s enjoy a lot of extras from the EU and US in terms of military support (especially post 9/11) that cuts a little bit of the financial sting. Finally, the military situation is so much in their favor that it is hard to think of a scenario where there is any real reason not to be careful and conservative. As Napoleon pointed out, “the victor loves peace.” Morocco can afford to wait until an agreement that suits their needs emerges because there is no significant military challenge to their current position.
Pro POLISARIO Situation: It is hard for me to think of a situation where the POLISARIO have the capacity to influence the negotiations in a way that is favorable to them: their position internationally is weak, their armed forces dwindling, and they are faced with a situation where Algeria can no longer afford to support them explicitly in an outright confrontation with Morocco, because the consequences for Algeria would be too significant. Until 1985 or so POLISARIO’s military situation was favorable and fighting seemed like a relatively good option but with the completion of the berm militarily things have only gotten worse. The POLISARIO is capable of pushing hard on the PR front but I can’t think of much that POLISARIO can do except negotiate and engage in occasional sabre rattling about not being able to “control” the situation if the solution reached is so unfavorable to POLISARIO that violence reemerges. Even if violence was to start again in the post-9/11 world I am afraid that not many people are going to view the POLISARIO movement favorably and a resumption of hostilities would allow Morocco the option to press for further gains while pretending to be the aggrieved party.
Pro-Moroccan Solution: This to me seems the most likely outcome in the long run barring some earth shattering change in the political calculus. Negotiations may be long and drawn out and Morocco may need to make some concessions to clinch a deal but on the whole I think that the Western Sahara is currently Morocco’s to lose. Especially given their strong position within the International System and the factors constraining Algeria from giving the POLISARIO the kind of significant support that they need to be competitive I think that even Algeria will eventually come around and put pressure on the POLISARIO to agree to a negotiated settlement. The US in particular will be in a position to sweeten the deal for Algeria and if the generals or Boutef is convinced that what the US is offering is better than the gains of destabilizing Morocco on the cheap I don’t think ideological concerns about the justice of the POLISARIO’s fight is going to keep Algeria from forcing POLISARIO to accept some kind of deal.
1 Comment
December 18, 2008 at 2:15 pm
Interesting post, and to a large extent I agree with your analysis, especially about the positions of the main government and NGO actors and the reasons for these positions. However, it’s worth emphasising that a pro-Morocco outcome would leave a rump Sahrawi state run by Polisario in the sizable area (some 1/4 – 1/3) of Western Sahara which Polisario currently controls east and south of the Berm. Unless, that is, Morocco invades this territory, in which case there is a significant risk of regional destabilisation. Algeria is unlikely to simply capitulate to further Moroccan expansion, and the Polisario and the exiled Sahrawi would presumably want to resist any such expansion. Algeria may well give them practical support.
Invasion or capitulation, there would still remain the issue of the refugees around Tindouf (some 165,000 based on Algerian estimates which are consistent with 2000 figures from the World Food Programme, which was feeding 155,000 people before it reduced its assistance to feed just 90,000). The hope on Morocco’s part is presumably that these would be assimilated by Algeria. Morocco consistently underestimates the number of refugees in the camps and claims that many are not Sahrawi (see a recent book in support of Morocco’s position by Abdel Hamid el-Ouali titled “Saharan Conflict”). So it seems unlikely that they would all be welcomed back, particularly as most of them are likely to be independence-minded (presumably the main reason Morocco has persistently blocked attempts to hold a referendum on independence).
See posts on my blog (http://nickbrooks.wordpress.com) for more discussion, e.g:
http://nickbrooks.wordpress.com/2008/06/25/interrogating-the-occupation/
Also a briefing note on the issue here:
http://nickbrooks.files.wordpress.com/2008/10/partition-and-propaganda.pdf